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OPINION 
                     
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
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 The Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women, a comprehensive reproductive 
health care facility that provides first-trimester abortions, the Greater Women's Medical 
Fund, a non-profit agency that provides financial assistance to low-income women in order 
to obtain abortions, and CHOICE, a telephone hot-line which provides information and 
referrals to its callers on many issues, including family planning and abortion 
(collectively, the "Providers"), ask this Court to declare invalid and enjoin the 
enforcement of sections 3215(c) and 3215(j) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1994), Pennsylvania's reporting and 
physician certification requirements for publicly-funded abortions under the Medicaid 
program.  The Governor of Pennsylvania, the State Treasurer, the Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, and the Deputy Secretary for Medical Assistance 
(collectively, "the Commonwealth") appeal from the order of the district court granting 
the Providers' motion for summary judgment.  The district court based its holding on the 
Providers' claim that the Pennsylvania statute is preempted by the Hyde Amendment.  
 We conclude that the Secretary of Health and Human Services is owed deference 
regarding her interpretation of the Hyde Amendment mandates.  Because the Secretary has 
determined that reporting requirements are permissible under the Medicaid Act, as modified 
by the Hyde Amendment, only if they contain a waiver provision, and since the Pennsylvania 
Abortion Control Act contains no such provision, we find § 3215(j) of the Pennsylvania 
statute directly in conflict with federal law, and thus, invalid to the extent that it 
conflicts with the Secretary's interpretation.  Furthermore, because the second-physician 
certification requirement pursuant to § 3215(c) is contrary to a federal regulation, it is 




 This action concerns Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the 
Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. V 1993).  The purpose of the 
Medicaid program is to help provide medical treatment for low-income people. Under the 
program, the state receives federal financial assistance in return for administering a 
Medicaid program that the state develops within parameters established by federal law and 
regulations.  42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (1994). 
 Establishment of a Medicaid program is voluntary on the part of each state.  
While states are not obligated to participate in the Medicaid program, each state that 
chooses to do so is required to develop its own state plan which must be approved by the 
Secretary.  In order to receive federal funds, a state's plan must conform, both on its 
face and as applied, with various federal requirements.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a, 1396c; 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2680 (1980); New Jersey v. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 670 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 
103 S. Ct. 56 (1982). 
 Under Title XIX, certain categories of medical care are mandatory, and must be 
provided by every state Medicaid plan, while other categories of care are optional, and 
each state has the discretion to cover the service.  See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10).  By law, 
states are required to fund medically necessary physician services.  42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a).  Participating states must establish eligibility requirements 
that are "consistent with the objectives" of Title XIX.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).  "Title 
XIX's broadly stated primary objective [is] to enable each State, as far as practicable, 
to furnish medical assistance to individuals whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the costs of necessary medical services."  Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444, 97 S. 
Ct. 2366, 2371 (1977) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(10)).  "A further objective is 
that policies governing eligibility be in the 'best interests' of the recipient." Hodgson 
v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Hennepin, 614 F.2d 601, 607 (8th Cir. 1980) 
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(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19); 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(11)).  The state must also provi
safeguards to assure that its Medicaid plan will be administered "in a manner consistent 
with simplicity of administration."  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19).  On the other hand, the 
state must "provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the 
payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to 
safeguard against unnecessary utilization."  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
 In addition, federal regulations require that each covered service be 
"sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose,"  42 C.F.R. 
§ 440.230(b) (1994), and mandate that states "may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the 
amount, duration, or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible recipient 
solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition."  42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c).
 If, after a hearing, the Secretary finds that an approved state plan no longer 
complies with the provisions of the Medicaid Act, or that the state had failed to comply 
substantially with any applicable federal requirement, the Secretary may notify the state 
that federal financial participation will be withheld or limited.  42 U.S.C. § 1396c.
 In 1976, Congress passed what is commonly called the Hyde Amendment, which 
prohibits federal reimbursement for abortions except in the narrow circumstances that 
Congress deems to be medically necessary.  Since 1976, Congress has added the Hyde 
Amendment to annual appropriations bills for the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services ("HHS").  While its provisions have varied to some degree from year to year, the 
effect of the Hyde Amendment has been to withdraw federal funding under Medicaid for most 
abortions.0 
                     
0The original Hyde Amendment, enacted in 1976, limited federal funding to abortions where 
"the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term."  Pub. L. 
No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).  The Hyde Amendment for the following 
fiscal year expanded the funding to include abortions for victims of rape and incest as 
well as "instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother 
would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians."  
Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).  From that year through 1981, the Hyde 
Amendment provided for reimbursement for abortions when a pregnancy resulted from rape or 
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 The Hyde Amendment for fiscal year 1994 permitted, for the first time since 
1981, expenditure of federal funds for abortions when "the pregnancy is the result of an 
act of rape or incest" as well as when "necessary to save the life of the mother."  Pub. 
L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 Stat. 1082, 1113 (1993).  The full version of the 1994 Hyde 
Amendment provides: 
None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be expended for 
any abortion except when it is made known to the Federal entity or 
official to which funds are appropriated under this Act that such 
procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother or that the 
pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. 
 
Id.0   
 This Court has previously held that the Medicaid statute, as modified by the 
Hyde Amendment, requires participating states to fund those abortions for which federal 
reimbursement is available.  Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1980).  See
Hodgson, 614 F.2d at 605; Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 134 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 2182 (1979).  We are bound by that precedent here. 
Accordingly, under Medicaid, funding for rape and incest abortions is mandatory for 
participating states. 
 The 1994 Hyde Amendment was reported out of committee with a provision requiring 
women seeking reimbursement for rape and incest abortions to report the crimes to the 
appropriate law enforcement officials.  139 Cong. Rec. H4304 (daily ed. June 30, 1993) (§ 
207).  However, a point of order was raised that the Hyde Amendment language violated 
parliamentary procedure of the House of Representatives, which prohibits attempts to 
"legislate" on an appropriations bill.  The point of order was conceded and the entire 
amendment stricken from the bill.  139 Cong. Rec. H4307-08. 
                                                                                          
incest.  The rape and incest provision was eliminated from the Hyde Amendment from 1982 
until the appropriations bill for fiscal year 1994. 
0The 1995 Hyde Amendment is identical in language to the 1994 version.  Pub. L. No. 103
333, § 509, 108 Stat. 2539, 2573 (1994). 
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 The Secretary of HHS has delegated her authority to oversee and enforce the 
Medicaid program to the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA").  49 Fed. Reg. 
35,247, 35,249 (1984).  HCFA has promulgated a regulation that provides: 
[Federal funding] is available in expenditures for an abortion when a 
physician has found, and certified in writing to the Medicaid agency, 
that on the basis of his professional judgment, the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. 
 
42 C.F.R. § 441.203 (1994). 
 In addition, on December 28, 1993, HCFA issued a directive to state Medicaid 
directors, explaining: 
The purpose of this letter is to notify [state Medicaid directors] 
about a recent Congressionally enacted revision to the "Hyde 
Amendment" which affects the Medicaid program and to tell you how this 
revision in the law is to be implemented. 
  . . . .  
As with all other mandatory medical services for which Federal funding 
is available, States are required to cover abortions that are 
medically necessary.  By definition, abortions that are necessary to 
save the life of the mother are medically necessary.  In addition, 
Congress this year added abortions for pregnancies resulting from rape 
and incest to the category of medically necessary abortions for which 
funding is provided. Based on the language of this year's Hyde 
Amendment and on the history of Congressional debate about the 
circumstances of victims of rape and incest, we believe that this 
change in the text of the Hyde Amendment signifies Congressional 
intent that abortions of pregnancies resulting from rape or incest are 
medically necessary in light of both medical and psychological health 
factors.  Therefore, abortions resulting from rape or incest should be 
considered to fall within the scope of services that are medically 
necessary. 
 
The definition of rape and incest should be determined in accordance 
with each State's own law.  States may impose reasonable reporting or 
documentation requirements on recipients or providers, as may be 
necessary to assure themselves that an abortion was for the purpose of 
terminating a pregnancy caused by an act of rape or incest.  States 
may not impose reporting or documentation requirements that deny or 
impede coverage for abortions where pregnancies result from rape or 
incest.  To insure that reporting requirements do not prevent or 
impede coverage for covered abortions, any such reporting requirement 
must be waived and the procedure considered to be reimbursable if the 
treating physician certifies that in his or her professional opinion, 
the patient was unable, for physical or psychological reasons, to 
comply with the requirement. 
8 
  . . . . 
By March 31, 1994, all States must ensure that their State Plans do 
not contain language that precludes [federal funding] for abortions 
that are performed to save the life of the mother or to terminate 
pregnancies resulting from rape or incest. 
 
Letter, from Sally K. Richardson, Director, Medicaid Bureau, to All State Medicaid 
Directors (Dec. 28, 1993) (emphasis added), App. at 92-93.0 
 However, under the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, no federal or state funds 
can be provided for the termination of pregnancies caused by rape or incest unless the 
state agency: (1) obtains a statement from the physician performing the abortion that the 
woman was a victim of rape or incest and that she personally reported the crime to the 
appropriate law enforcement agency together with the name of the offender; (2) obtains 
from the physician the woman's signed statement to that effect; and (3) verifies the 
reporting of the crime with the appropriate law-enforcement agency.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 3215(j) (Supp. 1994).0  The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act does not contain a 
waiver provision. 
                     
0HCFA reaffirmed its position regarding the Hyde Amendment in another letter to state 
Medicaid Directors, which stated: 
 
HCFA will not establish a timeframe within which cases of rape or 
incest must be reported to a law enforcement or other agency.  State 
law or policy should dictate when and to whom a rape or a case of 
incest must be reported.  However, as noted in my December 28 letter, 
the State-established reporting requirements may not serve as an 
additional coverage requirement to deny or impede payment for 
abortions where pregnancies result from rape or incent (sic). 
 
The State must establish procedures which permit the reporting 
requirements to be waived, and the procedure reimbursed, if the 
treating physician certifies that, in his or her professional opinion, 
the patient was unable, for physical or psychological reasons, to 
comply with the reporting requirements. 
 
Letter, from Sally K. Richardson, Director, Medicaid Bureau, to All State Medicaid 
Directors (Mar. 25, 1994) (emphasis added), App. at 116-17. 
0Section 3215(j) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act provides: 
 
No Commonwealth agency shall make any payment from Federal or State 
funds appropriated by the Commonwealth for the performance of any 
9 
 In addition, in cases where carrying the fetus to term would endanger the life 
of the mother, the Pennsylvania Act provides that no state or federal funds can be 
expended unless the danger is certified by a physician who is not the physician who will 
perform the abortion and who has no financial interest in the procedure.  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 3215(c) (Supp. 1994).0 
                                                                                          
abortion pursuant to subsection (c)(2) or (3) unless the Commonwealth 
agency first: 
 
(1) receives from the physician or facility seeking payment 
a statement signed by the physician performing the abortion 
stating that, prior to performing the abortion, he obtained 
a non-notarized, signed statement from the pregnant woman 
stating that she was a victim of rape or incest, as the case 
may be, and that she reported the crime, including the 
identity of the offender, if known, to a law enforcement 
agency having the requisite jurisdiction or, in the case of 
incest where a pregnant minor is the victim, to the county 
child protective service agency and stating the name of the 
law enforcement agency or child protective service agency to 
which the report was made and the date such report was made; 
 
(2) receives from the physician or facility seeking payment, 
the signed statement of the pregnant woman which is 
described in paragraph (1).  The statement shall bear the 
notice that any false statements made therein are punishable 
by law and shall state that the pregnant woman is aware that 
false reports to law enforcement authorities are punishable 
by law; and  
 
(3) verifies with the law enforcement agency or child 
protective service agency named in the statement of the 
pregnant women whether a report of rape or incest was filed 
with the agency in accordance with the statement. 
 
The Commonwealth agency shall report any evidence of false statements, 
of false reports to law enforcement authorities or of fraud in the 
procurement or attempted procurement of any payment from Federal or 
State funds appropriated by the Commonwealth pursuant to this section 
to the district attorney of appropriate jurisdiction and, where 
appropriate, to the Attorney General. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3215(j). 
 
0Section 3215(c) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act provides, in pertinent part:
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 The Providers commenced this challenge to sections 3215(c) and 3215(j) of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, on their own behalf and on behalf of Medicaid-eligible 
rape and incest victims and Medicaid-eligible women whose lives are endangered but who 
cannot obtain second-physician certification. The Providers argued in the district court 
that the Commonwealth's reporting and certification requirements are inconsistent with the 
Hyde Amendment, and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United Stated 
Constitution.0 
 The district court granted the Providers' motion for summary judgment on the 
Supremacy Clause claim.  Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll, No. 94
0169, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1994).  Relying on our decision in Roe v. Casey
623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980), the district court first acknowledged that Pennsylvania must 
                                                                                          
No Commonwealth funds and no Federal funds which are appropriated by 
the Commonwealth shall be expended by any State or local government 
agency for the performance of abortion, except: 
 
(1) When abortion is necessary to avert the death of the 
mother on certification by a physician.  When such physician 
will perform the abortion or has a pecuniary or proprietary 
interest in the abortion there shall be a separate 
certification from a physician who has no such interest. 
 
(2) When abortion is performed in the case of pregnancy 
caused by rape which, prior to the performance of the 
abortion, has been reported, together with the identity of 
the offender, if known, to a law enforcement agency having 
the requisite jurisdiction and has been personally reported 
by the victim. 
 
(3) When abortion is performed in the case of pregnancy 
caused by incest which, prior to the performance of the 
abortion, has been personally reported by the victim to a 
law enforcement agency having the requisite jurisdiction, 
or, in the case of a minor, to the county child protective 
service agency and the other party to the incestuous act has 
been named in such report. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3215(c). 
0The providers also challenged the second-physician certification provision as violative 
of Title XIX and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The district court 
did not address these additional claims. 
11 
cover all abortions for which federal reimbursement is provided under the Hyde Amendment.  
The court then reasoned: 
whereas the Hyde Amendment restricts abortion funding to cases of rape 
or incest, or where continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the 
life of the mother, the Pennsylvania statute imposes additional 
limitations.  To the extent of these additional limitations, 
therefore, the Pennsylvania statute is invalid, under familiar pre-
emption principles.   
 
Id. at 3.    
 The district court also found support for its holding in the fact that "the same 
kinds of reporting and certification requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania statute 
had appeared in earlier versions of the Hyde Amendment.  They were removed in the current 
version, and efforts by abortion opponents to include them were rejected by Congress."  
Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The district court thus concluded that the legislative 
history indicates congressional intent to eliminate the reporting requirements.  Id.
Further, the district court also held that the crime-fighting and other interests advanced 
by the Commonwealth to justify the challenged provisions were inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Medicaid Act and were therefore impermissible.  Id. at 4. 
 The district court enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing sections 3215(c) and 
3215(j) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.  This appeal followed.  This Court 
granted the Commonwealth's motion to stay the order of the district court pending appeal, 
and the Providers' request to expedite this appeal.  We requested the Secretary of HHS to 
address as amicus the issue of the extent to which a state can require reporting and 
second-physician certification under the Medicaid Act and the Hyde Amendment in order for 
a woman to be entitled to an abortion. 
 
II. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR RAPE OR INCEST 
 The Secretary of HHS, who administers the Medicaid program, has interpreted the 
Medicaid statute as modified by the 1994 Hyde Amendment, to provide that, absent a waiver 
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provision, reporting requirements for rape or incest abortions unduly impede or deter a 
woman's exercise of her right to the medically necessary procedure.  Letter, (Dec. 28, 
1993), App. at 93; Letter, (Mar. 25, 1994), App. at 117.  The Secretary does not regard 
reporting requirements as per se invalid.  Id.  If this judgment is a reasonable exercise 
of the Secretary's discretion, it is entitled to due deference.  Our inquiry is therefore 
focused upon whether the Secretary's interpretation warrants our deference. 
A. 
 The Commonwealth disputes both the Secretary's and the district court's 
interpretations of the Hyde Amendment mandates regarding reporting requirements.  The 
Commonwealth maintains that its requirements are valid and should be upheld in their 
entirety. 
 The Commonwealth acknowledges that under the Medicaid program, states are free 
to participate or not as they see fit, but if a state does elect to participate, it must 
comply with the conditions that Congress has set.  The Commonwealth, however, citing 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540 
(1981), argues that in setting those conditions, "Congress [must] speak with a clear 
voice."  It contends that a program like Medicaid: 
is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the 
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions . . . .  
There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware 
of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.  
Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of 
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. [Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 
17, 101 S. Ct. 1540 (citation and footnote omitted).] 
 
 The Commonwealth maintains that on its face, the 1994 Hyde Amendment is a simple 
prohibition on the use of federal money for certain specified purposes.  It sets neither 
requirements nor prohibitions on the states; it says nothing explicit about reporting or 
certification procedures.  The Commonwealth concludes that the principles articulated in 
Pennhurst, when applied to this case, require that the district court's holding be 
13 
reversed because it cannot reasonably be said that Congress has "unambiguously" forbidden 
reporting and certification requirements such as those contained in the Pennsylvania law.
 The Commonwealth's reliance on Pennhurst is misplaced. Pennhurst involved the 
obligations of states under the federal Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 ("DDABRA").  In reversing our holding that the "bill of 
rights" provision of the DDABRA created enforceable rights and obligations, the Supreme 
Court found no evidence that Congress intended to condition the grant of federal funds on 
the states' "assum[ing] the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least 
restrictive environment' to their mentally retarded citizens."  451 U.S. at 18, 101 S. Ct. 
at 1540. The Court reasoned that because Congress failed to speak clearly regarding the 
state's obligations, it could not "fairly say that the State could make an informed 
choice" about participation in the joint program.  Id. at 25, 101 S. Ct. at 1544.  
 Here, the Medicaid Act by its terms requires state Medicaid plans to cover all 
medically necessary services that fall within the mandatory areas of care.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(a)(10)(A).  Moreover, nearly fifteen years ago, we made clear in Roe v. Casey
states participating in the Medicaid program must provide the abortion services that are 
enumerated in the Hyde Amendment.  623 F.2d at 836-37.  The 1994 Hyde Amendment plainly 
puts participating states on notice of their obligations to fund abortions where necessary 
to save a woman's life or where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth was given clear notice that, if it elected to continue to 
participate in the Medicaid program, it was obligated to provide funding for such 
abortions.  Furthermore, any participating state should have realized that reporting 
requirements could be so onerous as to defeat Congress' intent that Medicaid funding be 
provided for the categories of abortions in question.  Unlike the claims of the defendants 
in Pennhurst, the Commonwealth cannot reasonably claim that it was unaware of its 
obligations under the Medicaid Act, as modified by the Hyde Amendment and its implementing 
regulations.  As such, the Secretary is reasonable in interpreting the Hyde Amendment to 
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prohibit reporting requirements that operate as additional coverage requirements to deny 
or impede some women from receiving the mandated abortion services. 
 The Commonwealth further maintains that other provisions of Title XIX authorize 
the challenged provisions. Participating states are required to adopt "reasonable 
standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance."  42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).  States are likewise required to adopt "such safeguards as ma
necessary to assure that eligibility for care and services under the plan will be 
determined, and such care and services will be provided, in a manner consistent with 
simplicity of administration and the best interests of the recipients."  42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(19). Additionally, states must "provide such methods and procedures relating to 
the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . 
as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization."  42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(a)(30)(A).  Moreover, the current version of the Hyde Amendment requires states to 
"make known" to the Secretary that the abortion for which funding is sought is one in 
which the life of the mother is endangered or where the pregnancy resulted from rape or 
incest.  The Commonwealth argues that Pennsylvania's reporting and certification 
procedures further these statutory mandates.   
 In her amicus brief, the Secretary acknowledges that Congress intended that 
states be allowed flexibility in developing procedures for administering their statutory 
obligations under the Medicaid statute and their state plans. Amicus Brief at 20 (citing 
Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 590-93, 102 S. Ct. 2597, 2610-11 (1982) (a state has the 
option to provide partial benefits to the medically needy); Mississippi Hospital Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 1983) (Congress intended states to be free to 
experiment with methods and standards of payment under their Medicaid plans)). The 
Secretary's regulations have long recognized that states have discretion to impose 
reasonable coverage limits, consistent with the objectives of the Act, on the amount, 
duration, and scope of services, particularly with respect to ensuring "utilization 
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control."  42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), (d).  Indeed, the Secretary acknowledges that while 
states are not required to adopt reporting requirements, properly tailored reporting 
requirements can serve the purposes of the Medicaid Act and the Hyde Amendment.   
 However, in reconciling these eligibility requirements of the Medicaid statute 
with the language and history of the Hyde Amendment, and with the other purposes of the 
Medicaid program, the Secretary maintains that state-established reporting requirements 
"may not serve as an additional coverage requirement to deny or impede payment for 
abortions where pregnancies result from rape or ince[s]t."  Letter, (Mar. 25, 1994), App. 
at 117. The Secretary has thus concluded that reasonable reporting requirements are valid 
only if they contain a waiver provision. 
 
B.  
 The Providers argue that the district court correctly held that the Supremacy 
Clause requires the invalidation of Pennsylvania's reporting and second-physician 
certification requirements because they directly conflict with federal law. The Supremacy 
Clause requires invalidation of any state constitutional or statutory provision that 
conflicts with federal law, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1393 
(1964), and compels compliance by participants in Title XIX federal aid programs with 
federal law and regulations.  King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 2133 
(1968); Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d at 837. 
 The Providers maintain that the district court properly relied on Roe v. Casey
in holding that all state Medicaid programs must fund all abortions for which federal 
funds are available.  In Roe v. Casey, we invalidated an earlier version of Pennsylvania's 
Medicaid funding restriction that proscribed coverage of abortions except when necessary 
to save the life of the pregnant woman.  The then-applicable Hyde Amendment, like the 1994 
Hyde Amendment, permitted the expenditure of funds for abortion where a pregnancy resulted 
from rape or incest, as well as in life-threatening circumstances.  We reasoned: 
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Title XIX, as now modified [by the current Hyde Amendment], requires 
the states to fund abortions in two categories: where the mother is 
endangered and where the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.  
Pennsylvania . . . would not fund the second category.  Because 
Pennsylvania's statutes are not consistent with the modified Title XIX 
it is clear that, as written, they cannot stand. 
 
Id. at 836-37. 
 The Providers argue that the district court correctly concluded that 
Pennsylvania's effort to restrict its Medicaid coverage of abortion to cases of reported
rape and incest and dually-certified life endangerment runs directly contrary to Roe v. 
Casey's mandate that Pennsylvania must fund all abortions for which federal funds are 
available.  According to the Providers, the Pennsylvania reporting requirements would be 
invalid under Roe v. Casey even if they contained a waiver provision. 
 We agree that Roe v. Casey holds that the Hyde Amendment establishes a mandatory 
floor of required services, below which states may not fall.  Under its ruling, all
who are eligible must receive the benefits that have been made available to them by 
Congress.  The question with which we are faced today focuses on the issue of eligibility 
requirements that are utilized by states to determine whether a woman is entitled to the 
services enumerated in the Hyde Amendment.  Roe v. Casey indicates that these eligibility 
requirements cannot be so onerous that they inhibit or deter women who are eligible to 
receive the abortion services from receiving them.  Roe v. Casey does not, however, 
invalidate all reporting requirements used for eligibility purposes. 
 The Providers further argue that the legislative history provides a clear 
indication of congressional intent to prohibit the reporting and certification 
requirements contained in the Pennsylvania statute.  The Providers note that in past 
versions of the Hyde Amendment, Congress had specifically included reporting requirements 
for rape and incest victims, and contained second-physician requirements for abortions in 
cases of severe and long-lasting physical health damage.  See Pub. L. No. 96-536, § 109, 
94 Stat. 3166, 3170 (1980) (1981 Hyde Amendment) (providing funding for rape or incest 
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victims "when such rape has been reported within seventy-two hours to a law enforcement 
agency or public health service"); Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979) 
(1980 Hyde Amendment) (providing Medicaid funded abortions for rape or incest victims 
"when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public 
health service"); Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978) (1979 Hyde 
Amendment) (restricting Medicaid funding in cases of severe and long-lasting health damage 
to those cases "so determined by two physicians"); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 
1460 (1977) (1978 Hyde Amendment) (same). Additionally, in 1993, Congress considered but 
rejected a version of the 1994 Hyde Amendment that contained such a requirement. See
Cong. Rec. H4304 (daily ed. June 30, 1993) (showing previous version of amendment which 
included reporting requirement).  The Providers contend that the district court properly 
inferred that, in repudiating previous versions of the Hyde Amendment, Congress clearly 
intended to eliminate provisions such as those at issue here. 
 The district court's reading of the legislative history goes too far.  While 
Congress clearly no longer requires the states to implement reporting and certification 
procedures, it does not follow that states are now forbidden to have them.  At most, the 
rejection of the earlier versions of the Hyde Amendment is a sign that Congress did not 
wish to mandate reporting requirements on the states.  Cf. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. 
Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank,    U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 517, 526 (1993) (courts are guided 
by the statute's words, not by discarded draft legislation).  Moreover, we note that 
Congress' rejection of the reporting requirements for the 1994 Hyde Amendment was 
expressly based on procedural considerations.  See 139 Cong. Rec. H4307-08.  A rejection 
on procedural grounds provides no basis for any inference regarding Congress' views about 
the substantive provisions of the legislation.  We are therefore left with no guidance 




 We are thus faced with competing interests within the Medicaid statute as 
amended by the 1994 Hyde Amendment.  On one hand, the Pennsylvania reporting requirements 
that require a physician's averment setting forth that the woman signed a statement that 
her pregnancy was the result of rape or incest can be defended on the ground that they 
further the state's interest under the Hyde Amendment in being able to "make known" to the 
Secretary that an abortion was performed upon a woman's representation that the pregnancy 
was the result of rape or incest.  The requirement under Pennsylvania law that a woman 
report the rape or incest to law enforcement agencies can be defended as an attempt to 
ensure that the woman's representations are true as a part of the state's obligation to 
"safeguard against unnecessary utilization."  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).  
 On the other hand, however, the Supreme Court has held that a state law that 
establishes benefit eligibility criteria for a federal program that are more restrictive 
than the criteria established by Congress is invalid.  King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, 
88 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (1968).  Likewise, our decision in Roe v. Casey sets a mandatory 
floor of services that must be provided by the states under the Medicaid Act, as modified 
by the Hyde Amendment, which cannot be undermined by onerous reporting requirements.  
Furthermore, § 1369a(a)(19) requires that the state provide safeguards to assure that the 
plan will be administered "in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration and 
the best interests of the recipients."0     
                     
0The legislative history of this provision establishes that Congress added it to ensure
that states would not impose bureaucratic and complicated mechanisms for determining 
eligibility that would deter recipients from obtaining care. 
 
This provision was included in order to provide some assurance that 
the States will not use unduly complicated methods of determining 
eligibility which have the effect of delaying in an unwarranted 
fashion the decision on eligibility for medical assistance or that the 
States will not administer the provisions for services in a way which 
adversely affects the availability or the quality of the care to be 
provided. The committee expects that under this provision, the States 
will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive policies and methods 
of investigation and that they will develop such procedures as will 
assure that the most effective working relationships with medical 
19 
 It can reasonably be argued that the Pennsylvania reporting requirements are 
inconsistent with this mandate because they create a formidable barrier for some women who 
would otherwise be eligible to obtain abortions in cases of rape and incest.  The 
Pennsylvania statute creates numerous hurdles for rape and incest victims: (1) a woman 
must personally report the incident of rape or incest to state law enforcement 
authorities, together with the name of the offender; (2) physicians are required to aver 
that they have obtained a signed statement from the pregnant woman verifying that she is 
pregnant as a result of rape or incest, that she complied with the reporting requirements, 
and that she is aware that false reporting is punishable by law; and (3) the Commonwealth 
must verify with a law enforcement agency or child protective service agency that the 
report was made.  It can reasonably be argued that these requirements can be 
insurmountable for a victim of rape or incest who may be traumatized by the event.  We are 
aware that rape is a vastly underreported crime, and it can be reasonably argued that 
reporting requirements such as Pennsylvania's can substantially deter some women fro
receiving services intended to be available to them under the statute. 
 The Secretary of HHS bears the responsibility of reconciling these competing 
interests in the statute.  The Supreme Court has noted that "[p]erhaps appreciating the 
complexity of what it had wrought, Congress conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad 
authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the [Medicaid] Act."  
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 101 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981). The Secretary 
has concluded that these competing interests are best reconciled if state reporting 
requirements contain a waiver provision allowing a treating physician to certify that the 
                                                                                          
facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order 
to encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision 
of services under the State plan. 
 
S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2017.
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woman was unable to comply with reporting requirements for physical or psychological 
reasons. 
 The Director of HCFA explained this point in her December 1993 directive to all 
state Medicaid directors: 
As with all other mandatory medical services for which Federal funding 
is available, States are required to cover abortions that are 
medically necessary . . . .  States may impose reasonable reporting or 
documentation requirements on recipients or providers, as may be 
necessary to assure themselves that an abortion was for the purpose of 
terminating a pregnancy caused by an act of rape or incest. States may 
not impose reporting or documentation requirements that deny or impede 
coverage for abortions where pregnancies result from rape or incest.  
To insure that reporting requirements do not prevent or impede 
coverage for covered abortions, any such reporting requirement must be 
waived and the procedure considered to be reimbursable if the treating 
physician certifies that in his or her professional opinion, the 
patient was unable, for physical or psychological reasons, to comply 
with the requirement. 
 
Letter, (Dec. 28, 1993), App. at 93.  See also Letter, (Mar. 25, 1994), App. at 117 
(reiterating the need for waiver provision in state-established reporting requirements).
 Under the Secretary's interpretation, physicians may take into account both th
immediate and long-term psychological consequences of reporting rape or incest to 
authorities that could leave a woman unable to fulfill those reporting requirements.  A 
waiver thus ensures that reporting requirements do not prevent or impede coverage fo
covered abortions.  Without Pennsylvania's assurance that it will waive the reporting 
requirements if the woman is physically or psychologically unable to comply, the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act requirements comprise impermissible eligibility 
criteria. 
 The December 1993 HCFA directive constituted the Secretary's attempt to give 
interpretive guidance to the states in advance of their submission of state Medicaid 
plans.0  The HCFA directive is an interpretation of the Hyde Amendment mandates as 
                     
0We are aware of the related action, Ridge v. Shalala, No. 94-7751, which is currently 
pending in this Court, in which the Commonwealth is challenging HHS's "waiver" requirement 
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reconciled with the competing interests within the Medicaid statute.  Since the directive 
clarifies and explains existing law, we deem it "interpretive."  See Bailey v. Sullivan
885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) ("If the rule in question merely clarifies or explains 
existing law or regulations, it will be deemed interpretive."); American Min. Congress v. 
MSHA, 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (setting out factors to distinguish between 
legislative and interpretive rules).  As an interpretive rule, the Secretary's 
pronouncements are exempted from the APA notice-and-comment requirements.  5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)(A) (notice requirement does not apply "to interpretive rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice").  This Court and the 
Supreme Court have upheld the validity of interpretive rules.  Bailey, 885 F.2d at 62; 
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,    U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 1232, 1237 (1995). 
 Courts have long recognized that "considerable weight" must be conferred to
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme which it is entrusted to 
administer.  The Supreme Court has announced that the principle of deference to 
administrative interpretation: 
has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to 
the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting 
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory 
policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary 
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations . . . 
.  If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we 
should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its 
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress 
would have sanctioned. 
 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45, 104 S. 
Ct. 2778, 2782-83 (1984) (citations omitted).  Such deference is appropriate here even 
though the Secretary's interpretation is not contained in a "legislative rule."  See
                                                                                          
as violative of the Administrative Procedures Act.  The district court dismissed the 
action on jurisdictional grounds because the Secretary has not yet called for a hearing 
nor issued a decision about the conformity of Pennsylvania's plan with the Hyde Amendment.  
Casey v. Shalala, No. 94-390 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1994). 
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e.g., Health Insurance Ass'n of America v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Hicks v. Cantrell, 803 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1986).  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
recently reversed our decision in Reno v. Koray, 21 F.3d 558, 562-65 (3d Cir. 1994), where 
we had declined to defer to the Bureau of Prisons' interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  
The Supreme Court explained: 
The Bureau, as the agency charged with administering the credit 
statute . . . has interpreted § 3585(b)'s "official detention" 
language to require credit for time spent by a defendant under a § 
3142(e) "detention order" . . . .  As we have explained, . . . the 
Bureau's interpretation is the most natural and reasonable reading of 
§ 3585(b)'s "official detention" language.  It is true that the 
Bureau's interpretation appears only in a "Program Statement" -- an 
internal agency guideline -- rather than in "published regulations 
subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedur[e] Act, including 
public notice and comment."  21 F.3d at 562. But BOP's internal agency 
guideline, which is akin to an "interpretive rule" that "do[es] not 
require notice-and-comment," Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 
514 U.S.   ,   (1995) (slip op., at 11), is still entitled to some 
deference, cf., Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991), since it is a "permissible 
construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467, U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  
 
Reno v. Koray, No. 94-790, 1995 WL 328305, at *7 (U.S. June 5, 1995) (footnote omitted).
 The Secretary's reconciliation of the competing interests in the Medicaid 
statute and Hyde Amendment is reasonable.  Because the Secretary's consistent and 
contemporaneously expressed construction of the Medicaid statute as amended by the Hyde 
Amendment is a reasonable one, it is accorded considerable weight under principles 
announced in Chevron.   
 Accordingly, we will defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the Hyde 
Amendment, and hold that because the Pennsylvania reporting requirements lack a waiver 
procedure and therefore may deprive eligible women of the benefits which Congress has made 
available to them, they are to this extent in conflict with federal law and are invalid.  
See Louisiana Public Service Comm'n. v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368-69, 106 S. Ct. 1890, 
1898-99 (1986) (under the Supremacy Clause, a federal agency acting within the scope of 
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its congressionally delegated authority has the power to preempt state regulation and 
render unenforceable state laws).  Thus, until Pennsylvania, pursuant to state law, adopts 
a waiver provision in accordance with the Secretary's directive, the Commonwealth is 
enjoined from enforcing its rape and incest reporting requirements. 
 
III. SECOND PHYSICIAN CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
 Like reporting requirements for abortions where pregnancies result from rape or 
incest, certification requirements for abortions necessary to save the life of the mother 
are not expressly addressed in the Hyde Amendment. However, pursuant to the broad 
authority to promulgate regulations in administering the Medicaid program, see, e.g.
Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 43, 101 S. Ct. at 2640, the Secretary, shortly after the passage of 
the first Hyde Amendment in 1977, promulgated a regulation concerning abortions where the 
mother's life was endangered.  The regulation provides: 
[Federal funding] is available in expenditures for an abortion when a 
physician has found, and certified in writing to the Medicaid agency, 
that on the basis of his professional judgment, the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. 
 
42 C.F.R. § 441.203 (emphasis added).  This regulation has not been altered in substance 
since its initial promulgation. 
 The Secretary construes this regulation to provide if any physician -- including 
a woman's attending physician --certifies that the life of the mother would be endangered, 
federal funding is "available."  Consistent with our holding in Roe v. Casey that states 
are required by the Medicaid Act to fund all abortion services that are allowed under the 
Hyde Amendment, the Secretary concludes that a state regulation that attempts, in effect, 
to require a second physician's certification in addition to a certification given by "a 
physician" is inconsistent with the regulation. 
 We must give substantial deference to an agency's construction of its own 
regulation.  Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150
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111 S. Ct. 1171, 1175-76 (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 
(1986).  As the Supreme Court recently announced, courts "must defer to the Secretary's 
interpretation unless an 'alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain 
language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's 
promulgation.'"  Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,    U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 2381, 
2386-87 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 458 U.S. 415, 430, 108 S. Ct. 1306, 1314 
(1988)).0    
 We believe that the Secretary's construction comports with the plain language of 
the regulation.  The phrase "[Federal funding] is available . . . for an abortion when 
physician has found and certified [that the mother's life is endangered]" does not limit 
the class of physicians who have the authority to certify.  We believe that this reading 
of the regulation gives the phrase "a physician" its ordinary and natural meaning.  
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,    U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001 (1994) ("[W]e construe a statutory 
term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.").   
 Further, the history of the physician certification regulation indicates that 
the Secretary intended this construction at the time of the regulation's promulgation.  
The 1976 Hyde Amendment provided for federal funding "where the life of the mother would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term."  Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 
1418, 1434 (1976). The 1976 Hyde Amendment did not require a physician's certification.  
The Secretary issued a notice of proposed rule-making which stated that: 
                     
0In Gardebring, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that the Secretary had not taken a 
position until that litigation, held that:  
when it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing, and when 
there is no claim in this Court that the regulation violates any 
constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to 
substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that 
alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or 
by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the 
regulation's promulgation. 
 
458 U.S. at 430, 108 S. Ct. at 1314.  Thus, we will defer to the Secretary's construction 
of her own regulation even if the interpretation is put forth in litigation. 
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the Department will provide Federal financial participation in the 
cost of abortions only where the attending physician, on the basis of 
his or her professional judgment, has certified that the abortion is 
necessary because the life of the mother would be endangered if the 
fetus were carried to term. 
 
42 Fed. Reg. 40486 (1977) (emphasis added).  The Secretary construed this notice as 
meaning that "in the absence of fraud, the physician's judgment would be conclusive."  43 
Fed. Reg. 4574 (1978).   
 In enacting the 1977 Hyde Amendment, Congress retained the 1976 Hyde Amendment 
language concerning funding for abortions when the mother's life is endangered.  Pub. L. 
No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).  The Secretary concluded that the failure of 
Congress to question the manner in which the Secretary had previously implemented the 
exception, and its reenactment without change, should be understood as congressional 
approval of the Secretary's interpretation.  43 Fed. Reg. 4574.  Thus, notwithstanding 
Congress' silence, the Secretary's 1977 implementing regulations construed the intent of 
Congress to be that certification of life endangerment by a physician should be required.  
43 Fed. Reg. 4570 (§ 50.304).  Accordingly, the Secretary's construction of her 
regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 441.203, as providing for federal funding when "any physician" 
including a woman's attending physician -- certifies that the life of the mother would be 
endangered, is consistent with the history of the regulation. 
 The Secretary's construction is also consistent with other requirements of Title 
XIX and its implementing regulations. Section 1396a(a)(17) mandates that states establish 
eligibility requirements that are "consistent with the objectives" of Title XIX.  42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).  In Beal v. Doe, the Supreme Court explained that "Title XIX's 
broadly stated primary objective [is] to enable each state, as far as practicable, to 
furnish medical assistance to individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to 
meet the costs of necessary medical services."  Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444, 97 S. Ct. 
2366, 2371 (1977) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(10)).  A further objective is to 
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assure that state Medicaid plans are administered "in a manner consistent with simplicity 
of administration and the best interest of the recipients."  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19); 
Hodgson, 614 F.2d at 607.  The Secretary's construction of the implementing regulation for 
the endangerment certification provision could be said to further these objectives.  In 
1977, in promulgating 42 C.F.R. § 441.203, the Secretary noted: 
The purpose of the certification requirement is not to enable the 
Department to question physician judgment, but rather to ensure that 
physician judgment has in fact been exercised.  This is the most 
efficient manner by which a State agency or a program or project -- or 
the Department in conducting audits or other enforcement reviews -- 
may ascertain that the statutory requirements for a claim for Federal 
financial participation in an abortion have been met. 
43 Fed. Reg. 4574.  Thus, we will defer to the Secretary's interpretation of her 
regulation that the sufficient condition triggering eligibility for a Medicaid funded 
abortion is certification by any physician that a woman's life would be endangered by 
carrying the fetus to term.   
 In contrast to the Secretary's construction of the federal certification 
regulation, Pennsylvania's certification requirements narrow the Secretary's criteria.  
The pertinent part of § 3215(c) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act provides that no 
state or federal funds will be expended for an abortion, except: 
When abortion is necessary to avert the death of the mother on 
certification by a physician.  When such physician will perform the 
abortion or has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the abortion 
there shall be a separate certification from a physician who has no 
such interest. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §3215(c)(1) (emphasis added).  Under the Commonwealth's Medicaid 
scheme, even if the attending physician who is to provide the abortion certifies that the 
procedure is necessary because of life endangerment, there must be yet another 
certification.  In effect, the Commonwealth's regulation renders the certification of an 
attending physician irrelevant.  This reading is contrary to the Secretary's regulation, 
which provides that federal funding is available under such circumstances. 
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 Accordingly, because the Pennsylvania second-physician certification requirement 
for abortions necessary to save the life of the mother conflicts with a Medicaid 
implementing regulation as construed by the Secretary, this requirement is invalid.
 
CONCLUSION 
 We hold that the Secretary's construction of the Hyde Amendment is reasonable 
and requires due deference.  Under the Secretary's interpretation, both § 3215(c) and § 
3215(j) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act are invalid insofar as they (1) fail to 
allow for a waiver of the rape and incest reporting requirements in accordance with the 
HCFA directives and (2) require certification by a second physician in cases where the 
life of the mother is endangered.  Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the dist
court to the extent that it enjoins the Commonwealth from (1) requiring certification by a 
second physician, and (2) enforcing its rape and incest reporting requirements until it 
adopts, pursuant to state law, a waiver in accordance with the HCFA directive.  In all 
other respects, these provisions remain enforceable.  We will remand for the entry of an 
order tailored in accordance with this decision. 
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Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center v. Knoll, No. 94-1954.    
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 Today, the majority holds that, by the simple expedient of writing a letter, a 
sub-cabinet-level federal bureaucrat can preempt the statutory enactment of an elected 
state legislature. It bases its holding on the principle of deference set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 
2778 (1984), and later cases.  Because I believe that what the Secretary would have us 
give her is not deference due, but rather deference run amok, I reach a different resu
than the majority, and must dissent.0 
I. 
A. 
 Federal courts are commanded by Chevron and a host of other cases to give 
deference to certain legal conclusions of administrative agencies.  But deference "cannot 
be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by 
an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress."  BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 
89, 97, 104 S. Ct. 439, 444 (1983); accord EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
____, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("deference is not 
abdication"); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 810 F.2d 325, 332 
(1st Cir. 1987). (quoting BATF). It is therefore vital that we carefully consider each 
case to determine whether deference is warranted, and if so, how much to accord.  Anything 
less has the potential to be judicial abdication rather than judicial review.  See 
                     
0My reasons for doing so are, regrettably for the readers who must digest them whole, 
somewhat lengthy and involved.  As Justice Scalia once said, "Administrative law is not 
for sissies--so you should lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs, and steel 
yourselves. . . ."  Hon. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 511. 
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Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 914-16 (3d Cir. 1981); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 
1122, 1134 (3d Cir. 1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting); Hon. Joseph W. Weis, 
Jr., A Judicial Perspective On Deference to Administrative Agencies: Some Grenades From 
the Trenches, 2 Admin. L.J. 301, 307 (1988).   
B. 
 The full language of the Hyde Amendment provides as follows: 
None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be expended for 
any abortion except when it is made known to the Federal entity or 
official to which funds are appropriated under this Act that such 
procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother or that the 
pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. 
 
Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 Stat. 1082, 1113 (1993).  As written, the statutory 
language neither requires nor forbids state reporting requirements in cases of rape or 
incest, and the majority quite correctly rejects the position of the providers and the 
district court that such requirements are per se in conflict with the Hyde Amendment 
(majority typescript at 20-24). The majority then goes on to hold that we must defer under 
Chevron to the interpretation of the Director of the Medicaid Bureau that reporting and 
certification requirements are invalid in the absence of a waiver provision.  Id. at 24
31.  I believe this to be incorrect. 
C. 
 In Chevron, the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated a legislative rule 
to define the statutory term "stationary source" as an entire manufacturing plant.  The 
Clean Air Act, while requiring permits for new or modified stationary sources, gave no 
indication of how such a source should be defined.  In approaching the standard for 
judicial review of the agency's choice, the Supreme Court employed a bifurcated analysis:
First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence 
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of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
 
467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82 (footnotes omitted).   
 To recapitulate, "the appropriate level of deference due an agency's 
construction of a statute that it administers depends on the clarity of the statute."  
Pennsylvania v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 928 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  In Chevron step one, we examine the statutory language to determine whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the issue; if it has, we do not even proceed to step two. 
Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886, 902 (3d Cir. 1994).  Only if Congress 
has not spoken, may we apply step two of the Chevron analysis.  And then we are limited to 
reviewing whether the agency's construction of the statute is "permissible."  Before a 
reviewing court can even reach step two, however, it must find that Congress explicitly or 
implicitly delegated to the agency the authority to construe the statutory provision at 
issue.  See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649, 110 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1990) 
("[A] precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of 
administrative authority.").  I simply do not believe there was a delegation here.  
infra Part IV. 
II. 
A. 
 The majority, relying on Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) and 
American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), concludes that the letters constitute validly promulgated interpretive rules rather 
than legislative rules (typescript at 28).0  I agree reluctantly that, under binding 
                     
0This conclusion is vital to the majority's holding.  Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, rules may be either legislative or nonlegislative.  A legislative rule must be 
promulgated according to the notice and comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553, which the 
Secretary did not do in this case.  See, e.g., Beazer E., Inc. v. United States Envtl. 
Protection Agency, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1992); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n
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circuit precedent, the letters must be treated as interpretive rules.  Were I unfettered 
by precedent, however, I would conclude that the letters are "spurious rules," entitled to 
no weight whatsoever, as I shall explain shortly. 
 In Bailey, we opined that "[i]f the rule in question merely clarifies or 
explains existing law or regulations, it will be deemed interpretive."  885 F.2d at 62.  
The majority seems to imply that, because the two letters clarify and explain the already
existing Medicaid Act and Hyde Amendment, they are interpretive.  But this reasoning 
proves too much.  Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any nonprocedural regulation that 
does not in some way explain or clarify an existing federal statute. 
 The reported decisions have been nearly unanimous in adopting a more restricted 
definition of what type rule merely clarifies or explains existing law.  If the position 
the agency takes in its rule flows directly from the statutory language itself, i.e., the 
court would reach the same construction of the statute even in the absence of the 
regulation, the rule is interpretive.  On the other hand, if the rule exercises a 
congressional delegation of power to make binding rules that create rights, assign duties 
or impose obligations, it is legislative.  This distinction was aptly explained in 
Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1994), where we stated, relying in part 
on FLRA v. Dep't of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 762 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc): 
The critical difference between legislative and interpretive rules is 
that the former have the force and effect of law while the latter do 
not.  Stated differently, legislative rules have substantive legal 
effect, while interpretive rules typically involve construction or 
clarification of a statute or regulation.  If a rule creates rights, 
assigns duties, or imposes obligations, the basic tenor of which is 
not already outlined in the law itself, then it is substantive 
[legislative].  Put yet another way, "what distinguishes interpretive 
from legislative rules is the legal base upon which the rule rests.  
If the rule is based on specific statutory provisions, and its 
validity stands or falls on the correctness of the agency's 
interpretation of those provisions, it is an interpretive rule.  If, 
                                                                                          
412 F.2d 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1969).  Indeed, a legislative rule which is not promulgated in 
accordance with the requirements of the APA is not entitled to have the force of law.  
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1718 (1979).
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however, the rule is based on an agency's power to exercise its 
judgment as to how best to implement a general statutory mandate, the 
rule is likely a legislative one."  United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 
821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
34 F.3d at 1264 (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).0  Thus, to the 
extent the majority purports to hold that any rule that explains or clarifies an ex
statute or regulation is interpretive notwithstanding the fact that the duties imposed 
thereby do not flow directly from the statutory language, its holding contravenes earlier 
decisions of this court, in violation of Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.
 American Mining is nothing more than a refinement of the law discussed above; 
that is to say, for a rule to be legislative and have the force of law, Congress must have 
delegated legislative power to the agency and the agency must have intended to exercise 
that power in promulgating its rule. 995 F.2d at 1109.  Under this test, to determine 
whether a rule is legislative or interpretive, a reviewing court uses four factors, any 
one of which indicates that the rule is legislative. The first, whether in the absence of 
the rule the agency could not succeed in an enforcement action, id. at 1112, simply 
restates the law discussed above.  The others, which include whether the agency has 
published its rule in the Code of Federal Regulations; whether the agency has explicitly 
invoked its legislative authority; or whether the rule amends a prior legislative rule, 
id., are additional factors indicating that a rule is legislative. 
B. 
 Under the American Mining test, the two letters at issue here are distinctly 
legislative in character.  Looking only at the plain language of the statute, there is 
                     
0Accord Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., ___ U.S. ____, ____, 115 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1995) 
(a rule that effects a change in the law is legislative and must comply with APA 
rulemaking requirements); Beazer E., 963 F.2d at 606 (interpretive rule only reminds 
parties of existing duties); Texaco, 412 F.2d at 744 (general statements of policy impose 
no rights or obligations).  This distinction is equally true in the case of federal
cooperative programs, such as Medicaid. See Ohio Dep't of Human Servs. v. United States 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1228, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1988) (HCFA Medicaid rule 
not interpretive); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238-289 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (federal 
regulation of state-administered program not interpretive). 
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simply no way that the Hyde Amendment itself can be construed to require or forbid 
reporting and certification requirements, with or without a waiver provision.  Even the 
majority recognizes as much, because it relies entirely on Chevron deference to reach its 
holding that Pennsylvania law is preempted.  See majority typescript at 20-31. In the 
absence of the two letters, there would be no plausible argument that Pennsylvania's 
reporting and certification requirements are invalid.  Accordingly, the letters fail the 
American Mining and Dia Navigation tests; they are not interpretive rules. 
 Because the Secretary failed to follow the § 553 notice and comment procedur
however, her two letters, while legislative in character, have no force of law whatsoever.  
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 302-03, 99 S. Ct. at 1718; Alaska v. United 
States Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Ronald 
F. Wright, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 3.13, at 49 (Supp. 1995). Indeed, as 
Professor Anthony points out, they are not true legislative rules at all, but rather 
examples of invalid "spurious rules;" that is, rules that go beyond mere interpretation of 
existing law and purport to have binding effect, yet were not submitted to notice and 
comment rulemaking. Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and 
"Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 Admin. L.J. 1, 9-10, 14 (1994).  Discussing American 
Mining, Professor Anthony argues that any rule meeting any of American Mining's four 
criteria without being subjected to notice and comment is a spurious rule and has no 
validity.  Id. at 15-22.  I agree.  
 Nevertheless, precedent constrains us to treat these two letters as interpretive 
rules.  In Daughters of Miriam Ctr. v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1255-56 & n.9 (3d Cir. 
1978), we stated that, because the agency's rules were not promulgated in accordance with 
§ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, "they perforce must be 
considered interpretive rules."  We also relied on the agency's characterization of the 
rules as interpretive.  Id.  Two years later, we followed the Mathews approach, "tak[ing] 
the agency at its word" that its rule was interpretive.  Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall
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620 F.2d 964, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1980).0  Thus, and although I strenuously disagree with the 
result, under Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 we must treat the agency's 
two letters as interpretive rules, despite their spurious character.  See United States v. 
Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 803 (3d Cir. 1994).0 
C. 
 The fact that we are required to treat the two letters as interpretive rules 
does not excuse the agency from its failure to follow the notice and comment rulemaking 
procedure, however. Where, as here, a regulatory agency intends to bind the public or the 
states, it is incumbent upon it to promulgate a valid legislative rule.  As we said in 
Navigation, the purpose of the § 553 notice and comment procedure is to insure public 
participation by and fairness to affected parties when lawmaking authority has been 
delegated to unelected, unrepresentative regulatory agencies.  34 F.3d at 1255 (quoting 
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).  It "avoid[s] the inherently 
arbitrary nature of unpublished determinations." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 94 S. 
Ct. 1055, 1073 (1974).  Notice and comment also serves the salutary purpose of forcing the 
agency to educate itself on the facts, issues and policy options available before issuing 
binding regulations.  FLRA, 966 F.2d at 763 (quoting Texaco, 412 F.2d at 744); Batterton
                     
0See also Ohio, 862 F.2d at 1234-35 (HCFA Medicaid rule was legislative in character but 
was treated for deference purposes as interpretive).  
0There is some evidence that the law of the circuit has evolved over the fifteen years 
since Cerro and Mathews.  In Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989), we stated that: 
 
The agency's label of an agency action, although one factor to be 
considered, does not control whether the action is in fact a 
[legislative] rulemaking.  Instead, it is the substance of what the 
agency has purported to do and has done which is decisive. 
 
Id. at 734 (citation to Cerro and other cases omitted).  It is apparent from this language 
that the Limerick court, like the courts in Dia Navigation and American Mining, took a 
functional approach to distinguishing legislative from interpretive rules. Nevertheless, 
there is no evidence in any of our cases, including FLRA (which was heard in banc), that 
the Cerro-Mathews approach has been overruled. 
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648 F.2d at 703-04 (same); accord Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246, 1254 
(3d Cir. 1980); Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit, Don't You?"  Agency Efforts 
to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 Admin L. Rev. 31, 32 (1992) 
[hereinafter Anthony, Agency Efforts].  I can say it no better than Professor Anthony, w
states: 
 Values served by the legislative rulemaking process are large 
ones.  Fairness is furthered by giving notice to those who are to be 
bound, both when the proposed rule is about to be considered and when 
the final rule is definitively published.  The accuracy and 
thoroughness of an agency's actions are enhanced by the requirement 
that it invite and consider the comments of all the world, including 
those of directly affected persons who are able, often uniquely, to 
supply pertinent information and analysis.  The acceptability and 
therefore the effectiveness of a final rule are elevated by the 
openness of the procedures through which it has been deliberated and 
by the public's sense of useful participation in a process that 
affects them.  Its legitimacy rests upon all of these considerations, 
as well as upon the foundational fact that the agency has observed the 
procedures laid down by Congress for establishing rules with the 
binding force of law.  The agency's accountability for its rules is 
deepened by the court-made requirement of a reasoned explanation based 
upon a substantial rulemaking record. 
 
 Beyond all of this, the APA rulemaking requirements impose a 
salutary discipline. That discipline deters casual and sloppy action, 
and thereby forestalls the confusion and needless litigation that can 
result from such action.  And that discipline reduces tendencies 
toward over-regulation or bureaucratic overreaching, and discourages 
low-profile attempts to create practically-binding norms that Congress 
or the Administration would not have approved. 
Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like--Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, 1373
(1992), also published as Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendations 
and Reports, Report for Recommendation 92-2, 1992 ACUS 71, 136-37.0  
                     
0The Administrative Conference of the United States adopted Professor Anthony's 
recommendation.  1992 ACUS 5, 41 Duke L.J. at 1384; see 1 C.F.R. 305.92-2.  Recommendation 
92-2 provides that "[a]gencies should not issue statements of general applicability that 
are intended to impose binding substantive standards or obligations upon affected persons 
without using legislative rulemaking procedures (normally including notice-and-comment)."
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 In State of New Jersey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 
1281 (3d Cir. 1981), we explained: 
 The APA notice and comment procedures exist for good reason: to 
ensure that unelected administrators, who are not directly accountable 
to the populace, are forced to justify their quasi-legislative 
rulemaking before an informed and skeptical public.  When these 
procedures are not followed in situations where they are in fact 
applicable, a court promotes neither the agency's ultimate mission nor 
respect for the law by ignoring the agency's indiscretion or condoning 
the agency's shortcut. 
There is indeed a great danger in giving Chevron deference (and often, legislative effect) 
to rules promulgated without the benefit of notice and comment rulemaking.  First of all, 
it encourages agencies to flout the Administrative Procedure Act and issue binding 
regulations in informal formats.  See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 
953 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring and dissenting) (agencies may yield to 
temptation and issue rules with legislative effect in interpretive formats to avoid 
scrutiny).  After all, once a reviewing court defers to the agency and upholds a rule, as 
the majority does here, it becomes law without the bother of the agency taking true 
legislative action.  Worse, it results in private parties (and, in this case, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) being bound by "a proposition they had no opportunity to 
shape and will have no meaningful opportunity to challenge when it is applied to them."  
National Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 240 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (citing Anthony, Agency Efforts, supra, at 38; quoting Robert A. Anthony, 
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 58 
(1990)); see also 1 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise
3.5, at 119-20 (1994) (Chevron deference inappropriate for nonlegislative rules).  I find 
such a result both politically undemocratic and jurisprudentially odious. 
III. 
 The majority, while treating the two letters as interpretive rules, nevertheless 
gives them full deference under Chevron, a case that arose in the context of a legislative 
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rule and quite different jurisprudential concerns.  I believe that this, too, is 
incorrect. 
A. 
 Before Chevron, the amount of consideration to be given interpretive rules was 
well-settled.  The classic statement from the Supreme Court was given in Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 164 (1944):  
 We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by 
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance.  The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control. 
This approach was reaffirmed three decades later in General Elec. Co v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125, 141-42, 97 S. Ct. 401, 411 (1976), where the Court analyzed an EEOC guideline as an 
interpretive rule under the Skidmore doctrine.0 
 Chevron, of course, was a watershed decision in the area of judicial deference 
to regulatory agencies. Significantly, however, Chevron involved a properly promulgated 
legislative rule.  That case simply did not deal with the level of consideration a court 
should give to an interpretive rule, and did not overrule Skidmore. 
 Indeed, in the years following Chevron, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that 
Skidmore consideration is the appropriate standard of review for interpretive rules.  In 
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, ____, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 
1179 (1991), the Court, citing Skidmore, opined that interpretive rules are not "entitled 
to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary's delegated 
lawmaking powers[.]"  And in EEOC, the Supreme Court again relied upon Skidmore and 
                     
0Accord Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 & n.9, 97 S. Ct. 2399, 2405-06 & n.9 
(1977); Morton, 415 U.S. at 237, 94 S. Ct. at 1075; State of New Jersey, 670 F.2d at 1282; 
Cerro, 620 F.2d at 980-82; Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 609 F.2d 686, 692 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Mathews, 590 F.2d at 1258. 
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Gilbert, not Chevron, to determine how much weight to give an interpretive rule.  499 U.S. 
at ____, 111 S. Ct. at 1235;0 accord Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice
U.S. 440, 463 n. 12, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2571-72 n.12 (1989) (interpretive rule entitled 
less weight, relying on Gilbert).  It is therefore manifest that Skidmore and Gilbert
survived Chevron. 
 Recently, in dicta, four panels have questioned whether Skidmore or Gilbert
overruled by Chevron.  See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 135
36 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994); Sekula v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 39 F.3d 448, 453-54 n.13 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Reich v. Local 30, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 6 F.3d 978, 987 n.14 (3d Cir. 
1993); International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1325 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 113 S. Ct. 1588 (1993).  None of these 
opinions discussed the effect of Martin or EEOC. 
 In fact, in several cases decided after Chevron, we have not given Chevron
deference to interpretive rules.  In Armstead v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban 
Dev., 815 F.2d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 1987), we stated that interpretive rules are not binding 
on the agency or the court.  Likewise, in American Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan
F.2d 901, 908 (3d Cir. 1990), we opined that "[i]nterpretive rules are entitled to no more 
weight on judicial review than their inherent persuasiveness commands" (citing Batterton 
v. Marshall, 648 F.2d at 705). Indeed, in FLRA, we applied this standard of review to an 
interpretive rule announced in letter form and refused to give it controlling weight.  966 
F.2d at 762-64 & n.14.  I think the above line of cases makes it clear that neither the 
Supreme Court nor this court has recognized any erosion of Skidmore or Gilbert. 
 In Snider, we refused to apply Chevron, holding that the statute was unambiguous 
under step one of the test and opining that "[c]omplexity alone is not enough to trigger 
                     
0Justice Scalia concurred, opining that the interpretive rule was entitled to Chevron
deference and that Gilbert was "an anachronism[.]"  Id. at ____, 111 S. Ct. at 1236.  It 
is thus clear that the majority held that Chevron was not applicable.   
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Chevron."  29 F.3d at 902.  We did, however, in evaluating the Secretary's position, look 
to one of the Skidmore factors to determine how much consideration to give to her 
interpretation. Because the Secretary had changed her position on the issue, we refused to 
give her interpretation "any deference," id., although it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that we gave it consideration but not controlling weight.0  In a similar vein is Mazza v. 
Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 903 F.2d 953, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990), in which, 
citing Skidmore and Gilbert, we rejected an agency interpretation that contradicted its 
earlier position. 
 One of our cases contains some language that superficially seems to support the 
majority's position.  In Kean v. Heckler, 799 F.2d 895, 902 (3d Cir. 1986), we purported 
to defer under Chevron to an agency interpretation.  Yet, we went on to consider factors 
normally relevant only in a Skidmore-Gilbert analysis, including the Secretary's alleged 
change in position, the fact that her interpretation was contemporaneous with the 
enactment of the statute, and the expertise of her agency.  Id. at 902-03.  Nowhere did we 
even intimate that Chevron had overruled Skidmore or Gilbert.  In any event, even if 
did hold that Chevron deference is required for agency interpretations, I conclude that it 
was implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in Martin and EEOC. 
 Many other courts agree that Skidmore-Gilbert is the appropriate standard of 
review for interpretive rules.  In Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Peña, 44 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 
1994) (en banc), cert. granted, No. 94-1592, 63 U.S.L.W. 3883, 3889, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4064, 
1995 WL 156485, (U.S. June 19, 1995), the court, while making clear that an interpretive 
rule is entitled to some deference, refused to "rubber stamp" the agency's action and 
rejected the contention that full Chevron deference applies to such rules.  Id. at 442
Instead, it applied the Skidmore factors and held that the interpretation deserved no 
                     
0We give consideration to the agency's interpretation (which many courts refer to as 
deference), then we decide how much weight the interpretation should receive.  To say that 
we give it "no deference" implies that we do not even consider it, which is not the case.
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deference.0 Significantly, the court also held that any deference (consideration) due an 
interpretation must arise from "the agency's diligent study of the statute and the 
underlying activity it seeks to regulate."  Id. at 443. 
 Similarly, in Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1987), a federal agency 
sent a letter to state welfare authorities restricting the eligibility of certain benefits 
from dependents of illegal aliens.  The Secretary argued that his regulation was entitled 
to Chevron deference, but the court disagreed, opining: 
The documents at issue in this case are interpretive rather than 
legislative in nature, and under longstanding principles, agency 
interpretations are not entitled to the same degree of deference 
commanded by the high-powered regulations in Chevron.  The Court in 
Chevron did not purport to alter the scope of review traditionally 
accorded interpretive documents. 
Id. at 1446 (citation omitted).  It continued: 
HHS did not engage in notice-and-comment rule making in issuing its 
AFDC-UP eligibility policy.  The agency cannot now contend that courts 
must accord to this policy the deference due a legislative rule when 
the agency has not followed the normal procedures associated with 
force-of-law rule making. 
Id.  The court then went on to analyze the interpretive rule under the Skidmore doctrine, 
refusing to give controlling weight to the rule on the grounds that the interpretation was 
not contemporaneous with the passage of the statute and the agency's reasoning was 
defective.  Id. at 1447-51.0 
                     
0Again, it would have been more accurate if the court had said that the interpretation 
would not be given controlling weight rather than it would be given no deference.  
0The overwhelming majority of the other federal courts of appeals has followed essentially 
the same reasoning.  See Kelley v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 841-42 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (policy statements and interpretive rulings not entitled to Chevron deference 
but are analyzed under Skidmore factors); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State 
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1994) (no Chevron deference to 
EPA advisory circular); Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(interpretive rules receive only Skidmore consideration); Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 
1220, 1228 (5th Cir. 1990) (interpretive rules not binding, relying on Skidmore); Ohio
862 F.2d at 1235 (6th Cir.) (according only Skidmore consideration to interpretive rule; 
thoroughness evident in agency reasoning was "most unimpressive"); Paxton v. Secretary of 
Health & Human Servs., 856 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpretive rule not given 
Chevron deference); St. Luke's Hosp., 810 F.2d at 331-32 (1st Cir.) (interpretation of
even ambiguous statute given only Skidmore consideration); Capitano v. Secretary of Health 
& Human Servs., 732 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1984) (rule treated as interpretive failed 
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 Indeed, in the D.C. Circuit, the court of appeals has issued a number of 
opinions to the effect that interpretive rules do not receive full Chevron deference, but, 
at most, Skidmore consideration.  As one panel said, "[a] binding policy is an oxymoron."  
Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Samaritan Health Serv. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court stated: 
While substantive rules are typically characterized as having the 
force and effect of law, interpretive rules enjoy a lesser deference--
doubtless in part because of the absence of public opportunity to 
comment. . . . Any deference that an interpretive rule may claim 
depends on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control." 
Id. at 1529 (quoting Skidmore) (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
accord American Fed'n of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(interpretive rule, while receiving "some" deference, does not receive full deference); 
Batterton, 648 F.2d at 702 (nonlegislative rules carry no more weight than their inherent 
persuasiveness commands).   
 The majority, however, relies on Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala
F.3d 412, 424 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995), 
for the proposition that Chevron "deference is appropriate even though the Secretary's 
interpretation is not contained in a 'legislative rule.'" See majority typescript at 29.
                                                                                          
Skidmore analysis); Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (interpretive rules get less deference than legislative rules, citing 
Skidmore). 
0The majority also relies on Hicks v. Cantrell, 803 F.2d 789, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1986).  
There, and with very little analysis, the court held that Chevron deference was owed to an 
agency interpretation.  Because of Hicks' minimal reasoning and its conflict with the 
overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the same issue (including the Supreme 
Court), I simply would not follow it. 
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There, because the parties agreed that Chevron applied, the court did not reach the issue, 
but stated in dictum that it had "often applied Chevron deference to interpretive rules 
without comment."  Id. at 424 n.8 (citing two cases).   
 One of the cases the Health Insurance court relied on is Wagner Seed Co. v. 
Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 970, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992), 
in which the EPA issued a rule in a decision letter rather than by notice and commen
rulemaking.  Id. at 921.  The court stated that "it is simply not the law of this circuit 
that an interpretive regulation does not receive the Chevron deference accorded a 
legislative regulation."  Id. at 922.  Nowhere in its opinion, however, did it address its 
prior contrary holdings, discussed above, and the cases it relied upon are opaque at best 
concerning deference to interpretive rules.  And notably, although Wagner Seed was decided 
shortly after the Supreme Court's decisions in Martin and EEOC, the court addressed 
neither of these cases in its opinion. 
 The other case cited in Health Insurance is General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus
742 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074, 105 S. Ct. 2153 
(1985).  In that case, which was decided only three months after Chevron, the court did 
apply Chevron deference to an interpretive rule, but again, without analyzing its prior 
holdings to determine whether they survived Chevron.  In any event, General Motors was 
decided before the Supreme Court's decisions in Martin and EEOC and cannot survive them.
 At best, then, these cases indicate an intra-circuit split of authority in the 
D.C. Circuit on the question of deference to interpretive rules.  Given the weight of 
authority against granting Chevron deference to interpretive rules, I am not persuaded by 
Health Insurance and the two cases it cites. 
 As final support for its holding that interpretive rules are entitled to 
deference, the majority relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reno v. Koray
___ U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995), rev'g Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994).  
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See majority typescript at 29-30.  Careful examination of that case reveals it to be 
inapposite. 
 In Koray, we held that time served by a defendant in a halfway house may 
constitute time spent in official detention, entitling him to credit against his sentence 
under 18 U.S.C. §3585(b).  Id. at 567.  We declined to grant full Chevron deference to 
Bureau of Prisons internal agency guidelines.  Id. at 562.  We did, however, citing 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 
2866 (1983), accord "some deference" to the extent the agency "engaged in the necessary 
'reasoned' analysis of this issue." Id.  Although that inquiry bears some similarity to a 
Skidmore analysis, we did not cite or apply Skidmore, Gilbert, Martin, or EEOC in Koray
Then, based entirely on the plain language of the statute, we held that the words 
"official detention" did not mean, as the government argued, "official detention by the 
Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons."  Id. at 563-64. 
 Our analysis in Koray was entirely within Chevron step one: whether Congress had 
plainly spoken to the issue, and the "deference" (really consideration) we gave the agency 
interpretation was likewise an aid to our step one analysis.  See Michael Herz, Deference 
Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 Admin. L.J. 187, 
208-09 (1992) (Skidmore analysis is a part of Chevron step one).  We simply never reached 
Chevron step two. 
 Neither did the Supreme Court.  In reversing our decision, the Court examined a 
number of related statutes using the phrase "official detention."  115 S. Ct. at 2025
Based entirely on its construction of § 3585(b) in pari materia with the other statutes 
and on the legislative history, the Supreme Court concluded that "the Bureau's 
interpretation is the most natural and reasonable reading of § 3585(b)'s 'official 
detention' language."  Id. at 2027. 
 The Supreme Court's decision in Koray is a classic Chevron step one holding; the 
Court construed the statute in accordance with the clear intent of Congress, and concluded 
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that our construction was erroneous.  Because the statute was not ambiguous, the Court 
simply did not reach step two of the Chevron analysis.  The Court stated only that the 
agency's interpretive rule "is still entitled to some deference, since it is a permissible 
construction of the statute[,]"0 id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted), opining that "it would be too much to say that the statute cannot bear the 
interpretation adopted by the Bureau."  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).0 
 It is important not to read too much into this language, however.  Both courts 
agreed that the agency's interpretation was entitled to "some deference."  115 S. Ct. at 
2027; 21 F.3d at 562.  I believe all the Supreme Court told us in Koray was that, because 
the agency's construction of the statute best reflected the clear intent of Congress, we 
should have give it controlling weight.  Koray did not hold that the statute was ambiguous 
or that there was a delegation of authority to the agency to fill a gap in the statutory 
scheme.  Because of that, as discussed earlier, Koray simply is not a step two case.
                     
0This language is taken from Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2782, where the Court 
sets forth step two of the Chevron test.  Because Koray is a step one case, I conclude 
that the use of that quotation amounts to, at most, an "imprecision in the Court's 
language," not an implicit part of its holding.  See Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ.
12 F.3d 1244, 1250 (3d Cir. 1993). 
0The Court quoted Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 91-92, 110 S. Ct. 960, 965-66 (1990).  
There, recipients of federal benefits challenged the Secretary's "netting" regulations, 
which were promulgated as legislative rules.  The recipients proffered a plausible 
construction but the court held--deferring under step two of Chevron--that at most, the 
recipients proved that the statute could bear their construction, but not that it could 
not bear the Secretary's construction.  That, according to the Court, was insufficient.  
While the Court's reasoning was certainly applicable to a step two case, Koray and this 
case arise under Chevron step one, which has a less-deferential standard. 
0Compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, No. 94-
U.S.L.W. 4665, 115 S. Ct. ____, 1885 U.S. LEXIS 4463, 1995 WL 382088 (U.S. June 29, 1995). 
There, the agency promulgated a proper legislative rule giving further meaning to the 
statutory term "take" under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.  While 
the Supreme Court engaged in an analysis of the text and legislative history of the Act, 
in the final analysis, it decided that "Congress did not unambiguously manifest its 
intent" to contradict the government's view of the statute.  The Court accordingly 
deferred to the "reasonable" interpretation of the agency.  63 U.S.L.W. at 4670. Sweet 
Home, in contrast to Koray, clearly implicated Chevron step two. 
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 In addition, the Koray Court did not overrule, limit or even criticize its 
earlier decisions in Skidmore, Morton, Gilbert, Martin or EEOC.  I therefore disagree with 
the majority's implicit assertion that the Supreme Court in Koray overruled all of those 
cases sub silentio.  Had the Supreme Court intended to make such a sweeping change in 
administrative law jurisprudence, it would have done so explicitly.  I conclude that the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Koray cannot support such a conclusion.  I therefore conclude 
that Skidmore and Gilbert, not Chevron step two, provide the appropriate standard of 
review for interpretive rules. 
B. 
 Under the standard enunciated in Skidmore, these two letters, to which we a
asked to defer, do not fare well.  In Skidmore, the Supreme Court focused on "the 
thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control."  323 U.S. at 140, 65 S. Ct. at 164.  It 
is also appropriate to consider whether the agency's interpretation is contemporaneous 
with the passage of the statute and has been in long use.  Davis v. United States, 495 
U.S. 472, 484, 110 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1990).  Finally, we may examine whether the agency 
has developed expertise over the subject matter at issue. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52, 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2679 (1990) (agency expertise is a 
principal justification for deference); Kelley, 17 F.3d at 842; Colorado Pub. Utilities 
Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1991); West, 879 F.2d at 1136-37 
(Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting); Capitano, 732 F.2d at 1076; Mathews, 590 F.2d 
at 1259. 
 First of all, it is apparent that the agency did not thoroughly consider the 
issue of reporting and certification requirements.  In the two letters to state Medicaid 
directors, the agency provides no explanation at all why states must have a waiver 
provision.  Other than the explanation it offers in its amicus brief (which we requested), 
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the agency offers no justification for its rule.  This is similar to the situation the 
court faced in Mathews, 590 F.2d at 1258, where the court rejected the agency's 
interpretation.   
 Even in her brief, the Secretary states only that lack of a waiver provision 
could become an "insuperable barrier" to victims of rape and incest seeking Medicaid
funded abortions, relying entirely on the fact that rape is a "vastly underreported" 
crime.  This is both speculative and shallow reasoning, and, in any event, is nothing more 
than a litigating position entitled to no weight.  See Martin, 499 U.S. at ____, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1179; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S. Ct. 468, 473
(1988).  Fundamentally, I remain unconvinced that the Secretary has really taken the 
necessary "hard look" at this question.  See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal 
Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("hard look" necessary to 
satisfy reviewing court that agency action not based on "impermissible whim, improper 
influence or misplaced zeal"), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91 S. Ct. 2233 (1971). 
 Second, although the agency's position is temporally fairly close to the 
enactment of the 1994 Hyde Amendment, it is not one of long-standing.  This factor, 
accordingly, does not favor according any deferential weight to the agency's 
interpretation.  See Davis, 495 U.S. at 484, 110 S. Ct. at 2022; Kelley, 17 F.3d at 842 
(refusing to give weight to contemporaneous interpretation not in long use); see also
Peña, 44 F.3d at 445 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (long-standing interpretations entitled 
to more weight only because they shed light on the meaning of the statute when enacted); 
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 279-80 (1985) (view of current 
administration, in the absence of long-standing, consistent interpretation, not entitled 
to weight). 
 Finally, I turn to the issue of agency expertise.  If this case involved any of 
the issues we typically review under the Medicaid Act, I would be the first to say that 
the Secretary has developed a tremendous amount of it.  That is not the case here, 
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however.  Under the Hyde Amendment, funding for abortion, even in cases of rape and 
incest, was forbidden from 1982 through 1993.  Quite simply, abortion of pregnancies 
caused by rape and incest is not something the agency has had to deal with within recent 
institutional memory.  And it certainly is no expert on the criminology of rape and incest 
reporting.  It therefore lacks any comparative advantage vis-a-vis this court with respect 
to the issue at hand.  I would therefore not accord the agency's interpretation 
controlling weight. See Hi-Craft Clothing, 660 F.2d at 915; Mathews, 590 F.2d at 1259; 
Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1333-34 (3d Cir. 1987) (Weis, J., concurring).
C. 
 My conclusion is philosophically annealed by the fact that the agency's letters 
do not merely regulate a private party: they attempt to preempt a state statute.  One of 
the reasons for Chevron deference is that "federal judges--who have no constituency
a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do."  Chevron, 467 U.S. 
866, 104 S. Ct. at 2793.  The argument is that agencies, which at least in theory are 
indirectly responsive to majoritarian pressure, are more legitimate policy makers than 
Article III courts.  With respect to regulation of private party conduct, that theory 
holds reasonably true; agencies are at least the delegates of the Congress and are often 
the subordinates of the Executive.  It is no secret, however, that what is true in theory 
may be less so in practice; because of superior expertise and "agency capture," actual 
agency action may be less majoritarian than we might hope. See Sanford N. Caust-
Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. 
L. Rev. 757, 814 (1991).  Even so, it is reasonable in such circumstances to favor the 
policy choices of agency heads rather than judges. 
 That situation shifts considerably, however, in the context of preemption.  
There, the two alternative policymakers are: (1) unelected and only theoretically 
accountable bureaucrats on one side of the balance; and (2) the elected state legislators 
on the other.  That is our case, and I think the balance tips sharply in favor of 
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upholding state law; not a federal agency's interpretation.  Under the Supremacy Clause, a 
federal agency only has the power to preempt when it clearly, conscientiously and lawfully 
exercises its delegated authority under § 553 of the APA, not when it issues an 
interpretive rule.  Cf. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.
U.S. 495, 503, 108 S. Ct. 1350, 1355 (1988) ("a clear and manifest [federal] purpose is 
always required" for preemption); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S. 
Ct. 988, 994 (1978) (same). 
 Indeed, under the law of this circuit, an interpretive rule cannot preempt state 
law.  See United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232, 1239 (3d Cir. 1986) 
("Because the regulations on which FmHA relies do not have the force of a congressional 
directive and because there is no indication that Congress intended an agency regulation 
to supersede long-standing uniform state law in this area, we decline to accept the 
government's position that the regulations control.").  This makes good logical sense, 
because it takes law to displace law, and an interpretive rule simply lacks the force of 
law.  Other courts and commentators appear to be in accord.  See 
Koch & Wright, supra, § 3.59, at 73-74 (Supp. 1995) (citing South Central Bell Tel. v. 
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 744 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds
U.S. 1166, 106 S. Ct. 2884 (1986); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n
742 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S. Ct. 2902 (1986)). 
IV. 
 That brings me finally to Pennsylvania's second physician certification 
requirement.  Unlike the agency's two letters explaining its interpretation of reporting 
and certification requirements, here the Secretary promulgated a valid legislative rule 
with the force of law.  See 42 C.F.R. §441.203 (speaking in terms of "a physician")  Her 
interpretation, therefore, would appear to flow directly from the text of her regulation, 
merely reminding states of an existing duty. 
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 I do not believe, however, that Congress ever delegated any authority for the 
Secretary to make such a rule.  I recognize that the Secretary has "exceptionally broad 
authority" to interpret the Medicaid Act itself, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 
43, 101 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981); see majority typescript at 26, but the Medicaid Act is 
not at issue here.  The statutory text under interpretation is the Hyde Amendment to the 
appropriations bill that funds the Medicaid program, and there is not one scintilla of 
evidence in the Hyde Amendment that Congress intended the Secretary to interpret eit
the scope and extent of her appropriation or the validity of state-imposed second 
physician certification requirements.  Unlike most substantive statutes administered by 
regulatory agencies, the Hyde Amendment contains no provision enabling the Secretary to 
make regulations with the force of law.  At best, it is silent on the issue.  The mere 
fact of legislative silence, however, does not necessarily imply the existence of a 
deliberate "gap" in the statute, much less a gap that we must infer Congress intended the 
Secretary to fill through administrative regulation.0  Because there was no delegation, 
the regulation upon which the majority relies is properly treated only as an interpretive 
rule.  See EEOC, 499 U.S. at ____, 111 S. Ct. at 1235; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141-42, 97 S. 
Ct. at 410-11; Batterton, 648 F.2d at 705. 
 Applying a Skidmore analysis to 42 C.F.R. § 441.203, it would probably, under 
normal circumstances, be entitled to controlling weight.  The regulation, after all, was 
enacted soon after the first Hyde Amendment was passed in 1977, and has not changed since.  
                     
0See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (presuming a delegation would enable agencies to "enjoy 
virtually limitless hegemony"); West, 879 F.2d at 1138 (Mansmann, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (mere silence or ambiguity does not automatically imply delegation to the 
agency); Weis, supra, at 305 ("If Congress has not clearly delegated a properly 
circumscribed power, then the agency should not obtain untrammeled discretion through 
legislative silence."); Herz, supra at 204 ("Courts should not equate a mere lack of 
clarity with a delegation of decision-making authority to the agency."); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 445 (1989) ("An 
ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power."); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 467 (1987) (same). 
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Moreover, because the Hyde Amendment has always permitted funding for Medicaid abortions 
where the life of the mother would otherwise be endangered, the agency does have 
considerable expertise in this area.  Ordinarily, then, I would agree with the majority 
that the Secretary's interpretation is controlling. 
 As I have already discussed in Part III(C), however, this is a preemption case, 
and an interpretive rule cannot preempt state law.  Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1239.  
Accordingly, I would uphold Pennsylvania's second physician certification requirement.
V. 
 Because the majority incorrectly defers under Chevron to the Secretary's 
interpretations, and because there is no basis for its holding in the Hyde Amendment 
itself, I dissent. 
